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The philosophical and natural-philosophical developments of the early modern period 
have long been subject to an especially pervasive grand narrative,  that of the conflict 
between empiricism and rationalism and its eventual synthesis in Kant. For quite some 
time now, that narrative has been routinely rejected. And yet there remains something 
attractive about such an all-encompassing approach, and the historiography of the early 
modern period has a tendency to seek out a replacement for the empiricism–rationalism 
opposition.  Eric  Watkins’  collection  aims  to  provide  that  replacement.  In  his 
introduction to the volume, Watkins notes the value of the alternative narratives that 
have appeared in the scholarship over the last twenty years or so (grounding of sciences, 
scepticism, evil, freedom, etc.) but criticises them for being too piecemeal. ‘What is thus 
needed’, he writes, ‘is a broader perspective that could unite these partial narratives into a 
single account’ (p. xvii). The goal of this collection is to show how the notion of order 
(whether natural, divine, human or moral) provides that unifying account.
The individual essays are all of high quality, as is to be expected, given the impressive 
roster. The first section of the book provides some context from medieval Aristotelian 
and  Jewish  thought.  Marilyn  McCord  Adams’  piece  is  a  thorough  overview  of  the 
relationship between the divine and natural orders in the work of Thomas Aquinas, Duns 
Scotus, and William of Ockham, while Steven Nadler’s succinct chapter argues that, for 
Maimonides, the intellectually virtuous can avoid the misfortunes of the natural order via 
knowledge gained from the overflow of God’s intellect.
2Daniel Garber opens the book’s second section (on the pre-Kantian early modern period) 
with a comparison of Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes, and Spinoza on God’s involvement in 
laws of nature. Garber concludes with the apposite (although underdeveloped) suggestion 
that modern science has maintained an early modern conception of natural laws while 
ignoring  their  metaphysical  baggage  –  similar  points  are  later  raised,  but  again  not 
developed, by both Peter Harrison and Eric Watkins. Robert Adams then presents an 
extensive account of Malebranche’s occasionalism. Malebranche recurs in Tad Schmaltz’s 
chapter, which argues that he is the originator of a particular tradition of addressing the 
natural and moral orders through universal laws that extends through Berkeley and (more 
surprisingly) Hume. Peter Harrison analyses the relations between Descartes, Cambridge 
Platonism,  and  Newtonianism  through  the  lens  of  laws  of  nature.  Both  Donald 
Rutherford and Martha Bolton then turn that lens on Leibniz. Rutherford argues for a 
reconciliation of laws with powers,  where each is  as explanatorily fundamental  as the 
other,  while  Bolton  argues  in  favour  of  an  interpretation  of  monadic  appetites  as 
exclusively desire-like.
That Kant gets the final section to himself appears to be a nod towards the traditional 
narrative.  Andrew Chignell  gives  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  notion  of  hope  in  Kant’s 
philosophy  of  religion,  showing  how its  role  in  the  moral  order  rests  on  a  minimal 
conception of the possibility of God. The volume concludes with Watkins’ argument that 
certain features of the natural and moral orders are only possible on the basis of the 
divine  order.  The  claim is  revisionary  in  redirecting  Kantian  anthropocentrism back 
towards the divine order, which, given Watkins’ aims for the volume, makes perfect sense.
3The  advantage  of  the  volume’s  approach  is  that  it  is  wonderfully  ambitious.  If  early 
modern philosophy really does turn out to have order as its overarching theme, it will 
provide us with rich, more historically adequate insight into the period. However, the 
volume does not quite reach its goal. Firstly, more needs to have been done to justify the 
assumed need for a unifying narrative. It may well be that the period involved various 
philosophies  that  overlapped  piecemeal  in  various  ways  without  any  single  unifying 
thread. Secondly, even if we accept the need for a unifying narrative, the volume would 
have benefitted from an extended, programmatic attempt to argue that it is order that 
plays that role. The introduction includes a few general remarks about how order was at 
issue (p. xviii), but the justification is missing. Presumably, the evidence in favour of order 
is intended to come out of the individual essays that make up the collection. What they 
show, however, is that order is an issue for certain early modern philosophers, but not 
that it is the issue that provides a united, single account. The picture that comes out of 
these essays is ultimately not that of order as a new grand narrative, but of order as a 
partial  narrative  that  usefully  highlights  various  features  of  various  philosophies  and 
various connections between them. Which is no bad thing.
